Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive which plays a central role in various secure multiparty computation tasks and management of keys in cryptography. In secret sharing protocols, a message is divided into shares given to recipient parties in such a way that some number of parties need to collaborate in order to reconstruct the message. Quantum protocols for the task commonly rely on multipartite entanglement. We present a multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol which requires only sequential communication of a single d-level system (for any prime d). It is scalable and can be realized with the state of the art technology.
Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive which plays a central role in various secure multiparty computation tasks and management of keys in cryptography. In secret sharing protocols, a message is divided into shares given to recipient parties in such a way that some number of parties need to collaborate in order to reconstruct the message. Quantum protocols for the task commonly rely on multipartite entanglement. We present a multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol which requires only sequential communication of a single d-level system (for any prime d). It is scalable and can be realized with the state of the art technology. Introduction.-Imagine that Alice has employed three strangers to execute some task on her account. However, Alice is aware that some of them (but not all) may be dishonest, attempting to sabotage the task. Therefore, she cannot send the complete information about the task to any of one of them. Alice wants to ensure that all three parties have to collaborate in executing the task, so that an honest party will be able to prevent any attempt of sabotage. In order to achieve this, Alice must split her message into three parts, each given to one and only one of the three parties in such a way that they all have to collaborate in order to reconstruct the original message.
Splitting a message into many shares so that the original message can be reconstructed if and only if at least a certain number of parties bring their shares together is called secret sharing. Solutions for the problem are known in classical cryptography [1, 2] . Secret sharing constitutes an important cryptographic primitive in protocols for secure multiparty computation including password-authenticated key agreement, hardware security modules, private querying of databases, and establishment of access codes with restricted access.
Classical secret sharing schemes utilize classical algorithms to split the message into shares and classical communication for the distribution of these shares to the relevant users. However, the security of the schemes is compromised by the fact that: 1) classical communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, and 2) the security of the algorithms is based on assumptions on the technology available to eavesdroppers. However, it is known that various quantum protocols offer strong security by making eavesdropping detectable [3, 4] . Quantum methods for secret sharing by three parties in a form of cryptographic protocol based on three particle GHZ entanglement [5] were given in [6] . In an independent later development Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) protocols for three or four parties were proposed in [7] . QSS for arbitrary many parties exploiting multipartite qubit entanglement are in [8] , wherein security issues were shown to be linked to Bell inequalities. A general QSS using multipartite d-level entanglement is given in [9] .
There are experimental demonstrations of QSS schemes. Three and four partite secret sharing using entanglement were reported in [11, 12] . Nevertheless, these entanglement-based protocols are not scalable. The difficulty of obtaining the required quantum correlations grows with the number of parties involved.
Fortunately, it has been shown that QSS can be achieved using only sequential communication of a single qubit [13] , making it scalable. The work reports a successful proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of six party secret sharing. Nevertheless, the security of proposed QSS schemes is not as robust as the security of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Possible security problems of both the entanglement-based scheme of [6, 7] and the single qubit scheme of [13] have been discussed in [14, 15] .
In this letter, we present a novel QSS protocol for N +1 parties using a single d-level quantum system, where d is an odd prime number. We investigate possible eavesdropping attacks. Finally, we discuss the scalability and efficiency of our protocol in comparison to the existing schemes. We restrict d to odd prime dimensions because our protocol uses a cyclic property of a set of Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUBs). Many MUBs are still unknown [16] . Complete sets are only known for dimensions which are powers of prime numbers [17] . For this restricted set of dimensions, the algebraic property on which our scheme relies was only found for odd prime dimensions.
A protocol using GHZ correlations.-Let us first describe a QSS protocol using multipartite d-level entanglement, for which d is an odd prime. This particular protocol is outlined in [9] .
This protocol is designed for N +1 party secret sharing and requires an N + 1 partite d-level GHZ state
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The party 1 (R 1 ) acting as the distributor prepares the GHZ state, keeps one particle, and distributes the remaining N particles to the respective recipient parties. This can be implemented with a source emitting a GHZ state and distributing it to all the parties. Each of the N + 1 parties will independently choose to measure on their particle of the GHZ state in one of d possible bases.
For security purposes, all parties choose their measurement bases from a set of d MUBs i.e., a set of d + 1 orthonormal bases {|e (j) l } l,j where j = 0, ..., d labels the basis and l = 0, ..., d−1 labels the vectors of the given basis j. The bases are MUBs if the vectors of two different bases, j = j , satisfy
Apart from the computational basis, for which we give the index j = d, and denote its states by |k , the remaining d MUBs are given by
where ω = e 2πi/d is the root of unity. Using number theory and Gaussian sums, it can be shown that (3) satisfies (2) for odd prime dimensions [18] . We will denote the set of all vectors belonging to MUB given in (3) by M and its elements M l,j , with the meaning of the indices as above.
In each run of the experiment party n (denoted later by R n ) chooses randomly a basis j n , and the measurement in the basis projects his/her part of the GHZ state onto one of vectors M l,jn . The corresponding global probability distribution is
For perfect GHZ correlations the parties must set their measurements such that
in such a case only results satisfying N +1 n=1 l n = 0 mod d occur, and all sets satisfying this are equally probable. If however the sum of the basis choices does not satisfy (5), then the probability distribution is uniform. This is easy to see once one realizes that (3) and (2) implies that | d−1 k=0 ω k(l+jk) | 2 = d for j = 0 and any l. Once the measurements are performed, the parties announce their choices of j n . The distributor checks condition (5): if it is satisfied, the round is treated as valid and is used for secret sharing, otherwise the round is rejected. Since the choices of j n are random for each party, it follows that the protocol succeeds in 1/d of the cases.
Single qudit protocol.-Our novel protocol relies on a cyclic property of the set of MUBs which we will outline before presenting the protocol.
We are interested in unitary transformations such that given any pair (l, j), the vector M l,j can be mapped into M l+l ,j+j for any l , j i.e. we seek a cyclic closure property for the set M such that elements of M are always mapped into elements of M . The classification of the unitary operations we need is performed in two steps.
Note that, for any (l, j) the vector M l,j can be transformed into M l+1,j by applying the transformation
This is shown using (6) and (3),
Also, any vector M l,j can be transformed into M l,j+1 by
This can be shown in analogy with (7), using (8) and (3). Thus, any MUB element M l,j is mapped into any other MUB element M l+l ,j+j by applying the operator X l d Y j d . For all l and j operation X l d Y j d applied to a state in M maps it onto an element of M .
The QSS protocol runs as follows.
(1) The distributor R 1 prepares the state |e
j=0 |j ∈ M , which will denoted by |ψ d 0 .
(2) R 1 picks two random numbers x 1 , y 1 ∈ {0, ..., d−1}, and applies to |ψ d 0 the following powers of the transformations: X x1 d Y y1 d . This gives |ψ d 1 ∈ M . The state is sent to party R 2 .
(3) For n = 2, ..., N the party R n generates two independent random numbers x n , y n ∈ {0, ..., d − 1}, and applies X xn d Y yn d to the qudit |ψ d n−1 received from R n−1 . R n 's action results in the state |ψ d n which R n sends to R n+1 .
(4) Similarly, the final party R N +1 applies X
Next, R N +1 measures the qudit in the basis j = 0. The outcome is labeled a ∈ {0, ..., d − 1} and announced publicly.
(5) In random order, all the parties R 2 , ..., R N announce their choice of y n , and then R 1 and R N +1 announce their respective y n in random order. If the following condition is satisfied, the round is treated as valid if N +1 n=1 y n = 0 mod d
otherwise the round is rejected. If the round is valid, the private data of the parties, {x n }, satisfy N +1 n=1
x n = a mod d.
The data exhibit perfect correlations and thus can be used for secret sharing, as it was the case for GHZ based protocols. Again, the probability of a valid round is 1/d. (6) In order to check the security, all parties announce their values of their private data x n for a randomly chosen subset of the rounds to check (10) . More details on that later.
The success of the protocol is due to the final state, after the all parties have performed their transformations, is
R N +1 's measurement of (11) yields an outcome with unit probability, provided the final state is an eigenstate of the measurement operator. This happens if and only if (9) is satisfied. In case (9) is not satisfied, the final state |ψ d N +1 is some element M l,j with j = 0 and thus by (2) the probability of any outcome is 1/d. For a valid run the correlations are effectively equivalent to the ones for the GHZ based protocol: the choice of y n corresponds to R n 's choice of measurement basis, while x n is analogous to the local outcome.
Attacking the protocol.-Protocols for QSS have to guarantee security. Let us assume that one of the parties R 2 , ..., R N , say R k , attempts an intercept-resend attack. When R k receives the qudit, he measures it in one of the d relevant MUBs. In 1/d of the cases, the attack will succeed but in d−1 d of the cases, R k will have chosen the wrong basis and thus altered the state of the system in such a way that if the state before R k 's measurement was |e (j) l the state after the measurement is |e (j ) l where j = j. The cheating will, to some extent depending on d, cause inconsistencies between the private data and (10), and is therefore in principle detectable in step (6) of the protocol. Taking for instance d = 5 will cause the eavesdropper to introduce an error at any given round with a probability of 80%. Thus it will be easier to detect eavesdropping for secret sharing schemes choosing larger d.
A more sophisticated attack from a participant within the scheme, possibly cooperating with other cheaters, causes challenges for secret sharing protocols and has revealed security breaches [14, 15] . Here we consider such an attack with respect to our single qudit protocol.
Suppose that for some k = 2, ..., N , R k is cheating. R k will obtain a state |ψ d k−1 from R k−1 but instead of performing the unitary X x k d Y y k d , R k stores the qudit in a quantum memory, and prepares a d-level the GHZ state |νµ = 1 √ d d−1 j=0 |jj and keeps the subsystem ν while transmitting subsystem µ to play the role of |ψ d k . Once the parties are to announce their choice of y n there can be two scenarios, (i) there is at least one n < k such that R n has not announced y n before it is R k 's turn. Then the cheating is to no use but nevertheless undetectable. To show the latter, let R k jointly measure the intercepted qudit |ψ d k−1 and ν in the generalized Bell basis spanned by the vectors |β j l = 1
k=0 ω k(l+jk) |k, k + j for l, j ∈ {0, ..., d − 1}. The state µ will be thrown into some element of M . If the outcome of the Bell measurement is associated to |β j l then the action of R k is y k = j . Furthermore, once the security is checked in step (6), R k can avoid detection. This follows from R k knowing all the y n 's since these have been declared before step (6) . If y 1 + ... + y k−1 = J mod d then the state of the system |ψ d k−1 was an element of {M l,J }. Thus, using the outcome of R k 's Bell measurement he can uniquely infer a fake value of x k allowing to pass the security check undetected. (ii) For all n = 1, ..., k − 1, R n has announced y n . Therefore, R k knows that |ψ d k−1 ∈ M l,J for some unknown l and J = y 1 + ... + y k−1 mod d. R k measures the |ψ d k−1 in the basis {|e (J) l } l and hence R k will find the state of the qudit with certainty. Subsequently, R k randomly chooses a y k and measures ν in the basis {|e (y k ) l } l . This measurement will cause the subsystem µ to be an element of {M l,y k }, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the measurement outcomes and the state of µ after measurement. Thus R k can fake the value of x k so his cheating cannot be detected in the security check. Nevertheless, R k has knowledge of the state |ψ d k−1 and therefore there exists a set of less than N − 1 participants such that if collaborating with R k they can infer the private data of any other party acting as the distributor.
Security against attacks.-It would seem as the above attack is successful in attacking our protocol. However, this is not the case since scenario (ii) never occurs due to the order in which the parties announce their y n in step (5) . Nevertheless, a generalization of the above attack to the case where many parties are collaborating cheaters our protocol is not sufficient to guarantee security for the entire secret, only for its part. For instance, if R 1 and R k are collaborating, there will be cases in where all parties R 2 , ..., R k−1 have announced their data y n and R 1 will simply inform R k about y 1 so R k can effectively cheat with the attack described above. We now propose a two approaches to enhance the security of our QSS protocol.
(I) The attack collaborating partners will succeed in a round only with some probability, p attack , roughly the ratio of collaborating cheaters over the number of parties. We can arbitrarily minimize p attack by asking the parties to repeat steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) in the protocol many times until a reasonable number of successful rounds is obtained and then perform the security check in step (6) . Let L be the number of successful rounds left after the security check. For all n = 1, ..., N + 1, R n lets his new private data be x
n −a (l) δ n,1 . Unless the cheaters succeeded in all L rounds, which happens with probability p L attack , the honest parties can proceed securely using x (L+1) j as private data. Consider the worst case scenario: there are N − 1 cheaters among the N + 1 parties. If we require that the cheaters succeed with a probability ofp then L = ln (p) / ln N −1 N +1 . As an example we takē p = 0.001 and N = 10. Then we need about L = 35 rounds in order to establish secure data {x (L+1) j }. If (1) we plot the number of required rounds, L, as a function of p for various number of parties N where we assume that all but two involved parties are collaborating cheaters.
(II) Higher security requirements against the collaborating parties attack can be provided with methods along the lines of the security analysis in [20] . The analysis considers this type of attack on the single qubit protocol in [13] and provides a modified protocol which is both secure and to some extent allows for localization of the cheaters. It is straightforward to generalize the scheme in [20] to include d-level systems.
Alternative quantum solutions to secret sharing.-There exists a number of proposed protocols for QSS. The protocol for three and four-partite QSS proposed in [7] and its generalization to high-level multipartite configurations [9] requires the preparation of a GHZ state with N + 1 subsystems. The experimental requirements on the quantum resources makes such QSS schemes based on the GHZ state unfeasible and highly unscalable. A second problem arises if we consider the highly realistic case of the involved parties not having perfect detectors. Let η ∈ [0, 1] be the detector efficiency. Given that the condition (5) is satisfied for a particular round, it is required that all parties succeed with their measurements otherwise the round has to be rejected. The probability that all N + 1 detectors give a successful detection is η N +1 . Additional obstacle is that d(N + 1) detectors required.
A second type of QSS protocol is one involving only QKD i.e., the distributor uses N pairwise independent QKD channels each shared with one of the recipients. For every round the distributor sends data x j to party j such that suitable correlations are obtained to achieve secret sharing. However, using d-level encoded QKD each recipient has a probability of 1/d to choose the correct basis. If the QKD scheme between the distributor and R n is repeated m times, the probability that R n chooses the correct basis at least once is
For successful secret sharing through QKD, the distributor has to repeat the scheme independently with each party until all of them have reported correct choice of basis at least once. The probability, p success , that for all n = 2, ..., N + 1, R n has at least one correct choice is p success = 1 − 1 − 1 d m N . Solving for the number of rounds m we find m = ln(1−p 1/N success ) ln(1−1/d) . To good approximation, this expression scales linearly with d, logarithmically with N while the behaviour for p is more complicated; the number of rounds will increase slowly for small p but rapidly for large p. As an example, let us consider a secret sharing involving N = 10 recipients. We pick d large so that the expression of our probability statement becomes a stronger estimation of the number of rounds required to distribute exactly one number to each recipient. Therefore let us take d = 23. Finally, we require that the probability of success is somewhat high, say p success = 0.8. Then the approximate number of rounds required is about m = 86. Evidently, for distributing a secret of realistic size in many shares, one will typically require many rounds of QKD. In this estimation we have not considered the parties having inefficient detectors. Including such an estimation will decrease the success probability per round with an average factor of η N . Furthermore to guarantee the security of QKD [19] there will be a need for larger data sets. Finally, we observe that the number of required detectors in this QSS scheme is dN which is about the same as in the GHZ state QSS scheme.
In our protocol, only a single qudit, which is easy to prepare experimentally, is required independently of the number of parties involved in the protocol which makes it experimentally feasible and scalable. Furthermore, only the final party performs a measurement. Thus, the success probability with non-perfect detectors is decreased with a factor of η. The scheme can be realized with d detectors.
Conclusions.-We present a single qudit protocol for multiparty secret sharing. Our solution does not rely on entanglement. This provides several advantages over previously existing schemes. The results demonstrate that single quantum systems can be useful in information processing tasks. However, it remains an open problem to construct a secure and efficient secret sharing scheme for arbitrary d not limited to odd primes. This is intimately related with properties of MUBs. Nevertheless, one can hope to construct a simpler QSS scheme exploiting only three MUBs which are known to exist for any d.
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